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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: RELIGION AS A FOUNT OF ETHNIC HOSTILITY 
OR AN AGENT OF RECONCILIATION? 
by 
David A. Steele 
Dr. David A. Steele (United Church of Christ) received his doctorate from University 
of Edinburgh, Scotland. In the last few years he visited the former Yugoslavia 
several times and has taught courses on conflict resolution. An earlier draft of this 
article first appeared under the title "Religion: Fount of Ethnic Hostility? Agent of 
Reconciliation?" in God With Us? The Roles of Religion in the Conflicts in the 
Former Yugoslavia, edited by Gerald Shenk, Uppsala, Sweden: Life and Peace 
Institute, 1993, pp. 28-48. 
Have religious groups in former Yugoslavia contributed to efforts of peace making or 
have they contributed toward the atmosphere which led to war? There have been rigorous 
denunciations, accusing all the main religious traditions of complicity, as well as denials of 
this by both indigenous and outside observers. The issue is certainly a complex one which 
necessitates looking beyond merely a recitation of the appropriate official statements on the 
part of the various religious hierarchies. One must also acknowledge when the unofficial 
statements of religious leaders seem, at least in the eyes of their counterparts, to contradict 
official statements. 
Furthermore, apart from any specific comment about war or peace, one must examine 
the role played by religious identity in the resurgence of ethnic identity. To what extent has 
the process of religious identity formation, on the part of the predominant religious 
traditions, contributed toward the sacralization of ones own nationality and the development 
of an atmosphere in which intolerance has been legitimized? Yet, even if it can be demon-
strated that the quest for religious identity has had these consequences, it is important to 
evaluate who is responsible. Is it the religious leadership which has sought to draw a 
connection between religious and ethnic identity? Or is it political leadership which has 
promulgated the misuse of religious traditions for this purpose? 
Finally, what implications can be drawn for the future? Are confession and repentance 
appropriate? If so, distinguishing between positive and negative formulations of identity will 
make this a difficult discerning process. In addition, there are certain to be some groups, or 
individuals within groups, who are more guilty than others. Or if religious groups really are 
not guilty, then how can they more effectively counter the misuse of religion? In either case, 
what are the possibilities for developing further the potential for reconciliation and peace 
making among the various religious traditions? 
To evaluate these issues, it is important, first, to look at both official and unofficial 
statements, on the part of religious leaders, regarding the war and violations of human rights. 
Second, the complex question of linkage between religious and ethnic identity must be 
examined with respect to its impact on the escalation of the conflict. Third, implications 
must be noted which may affect any future peacemaking efforts on the part of the various 
religious communities. 
I. Statements by religious leaders 
A. Positive statements 
On November 26, 1992, representatives of the hierarchies of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, the Catholic Church among Croats, and the Muslim community signed an "Appeal 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Among other demands, these religious leaders called 
for an end to the war, the distribution of humanitarian assistance without respect to faith or 
persuasion, the closing of all prison camps and releasing of all prisoners, an end to ethnic 
cleansing, the return of all refugees and displaced persons, and the cessation of all uses of 
religious symbols in any attempt to foster hatred or war. 1 This statement marked the first 
time that major leaders of the three primary religious traditions in former Yugoslavia had 
spoken with one voice to oppose the war. Previous attempts to bring them together for this 
purpose had failed due to numerous reasons. 
Contact did prove to be more feasible, however, between the Orthodox and Catholic 
leadership. Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Kuharic met in May and in August 1991. During 
the second meeting, in the midst of the Serb-Croat war, they called upon all people who 
believe in God to pray for peace and reconciliation. 2 A third meeting, which took place in 
September 1992, after a cease-fire agreement had been negotiated between Serbs and Croats, 
yielded a joint statement which itemized many of the same points which would be agreed 
upon two months later by the leadership of all three of the principal religious groups.3 
1
"Appeal for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Appeal of Conscience Foundation, 
Wolfsberg/Zurich, Switzerland, 26 November 1992. 
2
"Joint Statement of Franjo Cardinal Kuharic, Archbishop of Zagreb, Croatia and the Serbian 
Orthodox Patriarch, Pavle," at Slavonski Brod, Croatia, 24 August 1991, trans. by Rev. Anthony A. 
Petrusic and Melchior Masina (on file at the Office of International Justice and Peace, United States 
Catholic Conference, Washington, DC). 
3
"Message of Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Kuharic Following Their Meeting in Geneva on 23 
September 1992," in CEC (Conference of European Churches) Documentation Service, Volume 17, 
No. 34 ( 1992), pp. 22-24. 
2 
Various separate statements by the Croatian Catholic and Serbian Orthodox hierarchies 
contribute to this impression of support for human rights and opposition to war. For 
example, the Croatian Catholic Bishops, at their fall meeting in 1991, condemned "the evil 
of war" and supported "the rights of all minorities within established borders."4 More 
recently, the Catholic bishop and clergy of Banja Luka, despite living under Serb occupation, 
issued a similar statement with respect to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They made 
their protest against the war and called for respect of fundamental human rights "in the name 
of all menaced ... religious and national communities." They also stated that, since the 
beginning of the war, they had tried their best to see that "believers endowed to our pastoral 
care should not be tempted to use arms against their neighbors."5 
The Serbian Orthodox hierarchy has not only condemned the war and called for the 
recognition of human rights but has dissociated itself from the policies of the Serbian 
government. In an unprecedented statement the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church stated that the current regime did not "make possible equal rights for a 
democratic dialogue in society," and failed "to sincerely accept national reconciliation, to heal 
the consequences of the civil and fratricidal war and create preconditions for the spiritual 
regeneration and healing of the people." They charged the regime with the staging of 
elections and distanced the church from both the government and its constitution. They even 
called for "the creation of a government of people's confidence, national unity and salvation 
of all the people."6 
Islamic religious leaders have also expressed their opposition to the war, though often 
with an understandable emphasis on the consequent suffering of their own people. Hamdija 
Jusufspahic, the Mufti of Beograd, decried the violence of all war and called for dialogue 
between Muslims and Christians. He has even told foreign Muslims not to send arms, but 
to help them find sa/am (peace). He claimed that, "If half of the money spent on arms was 
spent on peace, we would have more believers, more happiness, and more peace."7 Other 
4
"Statement of Bishop's Fall Meeting - Zagreb, Croatia," I 6 October I 991, trans. by Rev. Anthony 
A. Petrusic and Melchior Masina (on file at the Office of International Justice and Peace, United 
States Catholic Conference, Washington, DC). 
5
"Dramatic Appeal for Help of the Bishop and the Clergy of the Diocese of Banja Luka," 24 
February I 993 (on file at the Office of International Justice and Peace, United States Catholic 
Conference, Washington, DC). 
6
"Memorandum of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Issued at Its 
Regular Session Held from the 14th to the 27th of May, 1992," (on fi·Ie at Krscanska Informativna 
Slu~ba, Zagreb) pp. 3-4. This statement was reiterated again one year later at the 1993 Holy Assem-
bly (see "Communique to the Public From the Regular Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church," trans. by N. Gerald Shenk, 29 May I 993). 
7Interview with Hamdija Jusufspahic, at the mosque in Beograd, 4 March I 993. 
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Muslim leaders have called for peace with Croats, with whom they claimed long-standing 
good relations, but not with Serbs, whom they saw as the enemy aggressor.8 Finally, after 
nearly a year of warfare, the Minister of Religious Affairs for the Bosnian Government 
affirmed the right of people of all faiths to live together in peace.9 
In addition to the above statements of general concern for peace and human rights, there 
have been instances of confession and regret regarding specific atrocities by ones own ethnic 
group, as well as personal restraint regarding accusations of blame on the part of others. The 
bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Banja Luka, Jefrem, signed an appeal condemning 
chetnik forces (Serb Nationalist paramilitary troops) for slaughtering Muslim believers at 
worship in a mosque and for attempting to create a "Greater Serbia."10 In another example 
of confession, Cardinal Kuharic expressed sorrow and protest over the attack on the museum 
and residence of the metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Zagreb, claiming that 
this act was a crime against God's command and against Croatian democracy.U An 
illustration of restraint comes, perhaps most appropriately, from the Mufti of Beograd after 
a bomb had exploded in the courtyard of his mosque. When asked who was to blame, he 
stated, "I do not know who placed the bomb, but I know that Serbs put out the fire." 12 
B. Negative statements 
Alongside the expressions of opposition to the war and affirmations of concern for other 
ethnic groups, there has been a darker side. Some people and groups within each religious 
tradition have, out of concern for the well-being of its own people, spoken and acted in ways 
which were perceived as a threat to others. Some such allegations may be dismissed as 
examples of heightened paranoia. It would be inappropriate and dangerous, however, to 
8 Sefko Omerbasic, imam in the mosque in Zagreb and president of Meshikat of the Islamic 
religious community for Croatia, in message delivered at Church of the Holy Cross in Zagreb, 25 
October 1992 (reported in Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, KIS AJ .26.02, 26 October 1992); and 
"Open Letter from the President of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Cardinal 
Franjo Kuharic of the Croatian Catholic Church (reported in Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, KIS 
AJ.22.02, 22 October 1993). 
9
"Mr. Darko Lukic, Minister for Religious Affairs in the Bosnian Government: 'Building a State'," 
in a quote taken from a recelll article in the Zagreb newspaper, Vecernji List (reported in Krscanska 
Informativna Sluzba, 2 February 1993). 
10
"The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Latest Appeal of the Religious Leaders in Banja 
Luka," 4 April 1992 (reported in Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, KIS A.07.04.02, 7 April 1992). 
11
"Cardinal Kuharic Protests Against the Attack on the Museum and Metropolis of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church in Zagreb" (reported in Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, KIS AD.21.01, 21 April 
1992). 
12Hamdija Jusufspahic in comment to Elizabeth Salter, member of the international affairs team 
of the World Council of Church's Unit on Justice, Peace and Creation (reported to this author in 
conversation with Elizabeth Salter, Geneva, 16 March 1993). 
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dismiss all such charges, for in them one can perceive not only legitimate fears of victimiza-
tion but also the dark side of unacknowledged biases. Each religious tradition can provide 
examples whereby concern for its own self -preservation has been turned into negative 
perceptions of, and actions toward, others. 
One example of this darker side within Serbian Orthodoxy came after the meeting 
between Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Kuharic in Geneva in September 1992. The Muslim 
religious leader, Reis-ul-ulema Jakub Selimoski, charged the Patriarch with saying one thing 
while doing another. According to him Pavle, despite having signed an agreement 
condemning war crimes, justified the massacre of Muslims by claiming that Serbs and 
Orthodoxy are endangered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 13 In another incident, Croatian 
church people accused Pavle of blessing the foundations of a new Serbian Orthodox Church 
which was being built on ground on which previously there had stood a Catholic church. In 
this town of Lovas, in Serb-occupied eastern Slavonia, there had been no Orthodox 
inhabitants prior to World War II. 14 A third example illustrates the common tendency to 
deny the sins of one's own people, thus feeding the hurt and anger of those who have been 
victims. The hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued in December 1992 a 
"Communique Concerning the False Accusations Against the Serbian Nation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina." Despite careful documentation by internationally renowned organizations, 
such as Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, the bishops denied that Serbian militias 
had held and raped 40,000 Muslim women. They claimed that such camps did not exist, 
while at the same time charging that Serbian women had suffered this abuse. What has been 
seen by the whole world as a horrendous atrocity, was depicted by the bishops as propaganda 
designed to satanize the Serbian people. 15 Accusations of bias on the part of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church have also been made by some Orthodox people. Six Orthodox writers and 
theologians published a letter in· Le Monde in November 1991 in which they charged the 
Serbian Orthodox Church with "contributing, undoubtedly, unconsciously, to incitements to 
hate." By focusing so much attention on the past sufferings of Serbs, and ignoring the fact 
13Reis-ul-ulema Jakub Selimoski, interview with Croatian/newspaper Vecern ji List (reported in 
"The Muslim Imam for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Abdulah Celebic, was Killed during a Serbian 
Artillery Attack on Sarajevo ... ," Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, 8 October 1992). 
14 
"Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop Accuses Croatian Authorities - While Serbian 
Patriarch Paul Blesses the Foundation Stone of a New Orthodox Church on the Ruins of the 
Destroyed Catholic Church in Lovas" (reported in Kdcanska Informativmi Sluzba, KIS AD3001, 30 
April 1992). 
15
"Communique Concerning the False Accusations Against the Serbian Nation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina," Beograd, December 1992 (on file at the Conference of European Churches, Geneva). 
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that most of the victims of the current war were Croatian, they claimed that the church was 
making itself the accomplice of a national communist war machine.16 
The Catholic Church in Croatia, on the other hand, was quick to itemize the incidents 
of "Serbian terrorism" during the Serbo-Croat warP They were blind, however, to the 
accusation of Serbian Orthodox people that the Croatian government and society were 
employing symbols which were a vivid reminder of the ustasha (Croatian fascist extremists) 
and creating an environment in which Serbian people did not feel safe. 18 Croatian bishops 
were also firm in. their support for the independence of Croatia, but ignored calls for the 
right of self -determination on the part of Serbs in Krajina, claiming that the existence of 
free democratic elections throughout the republic provided adequate constitutional 
justification for their position.19 As for the Croatian war effort, there are numerous 
examples of support from the Catholic Church. In September 1991, a Catholic youth 
magazine carried the message, "We are ready to die for our Fatherland," on the front page. 
Bishop Ante Juric of Split stated that "It is the duty of every Catholic to defend his 
Fatherland actively. In a moment like this a false pacifism is indirectly strengthening the 
aggressors and the bandits."20 Some voices within the Catholic Church in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have likewise given support both to the cause of the Bosnian Croats and to the 
militant means being pursued. Franciscan Ivo Markovic writes that the Catholic Church 
supported nationalistic parties as the only alternative to communism, while at the same time 
advocating close relations with Croatia. Furthermore, in the face of Serbian aggression and 
16
"Appeal to the Bishops of Serbia," Le Monde, 27 November 1991 (English translation on file 
at the Office of International Justice and Peace, United States Catholic Conference, Washington, DC). 
17Franjo Cardinal K uharic, "Report of Terrorism in the Territory of the Archdiocese of Zagreb, 
Croatia," 3 August 1991 (on file in the Office of International Justice and Peace, United States 
Catholic Conference, Washington, DC). 
18For a catalogue of incidents claimed by the Serbian Orthodox Church to be examples of 
Croatian oppression against its Serbian minority, see "Appeal of the Serbian Orthodox Church to the 
London Peace Conference on Yugoslavia," Beograd, 27 August 1992 (English translation on file at 
the Conference of European Churches, Geneva), pp. 4-5. An example of a Croatian Catholic 
rejection of all such incidents can be seen in a letter written to Patriarch Pavle by Father Anton 
Badurina in which he speaks of the "transparent propaganda regarding Serbs being threatened." 
(Anton Badurina, "An Open Letter to the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, His Holiness 
Pavle," Zagreb, 8 November 1991 [on file at the Office of International Justice and Peace, United 
States Catholic Conference, Washington, DC]), p. 5. 
19
"Statement of the Catholic Bishops of Jugoslavia," Zagreb, 27 June 1991 (on file at the Office 
of International Justice and Peace, United States Catholic Conference, Washington, DC); and 
"Statement of Bishop's Fall Meeting - Zagreb, Croatia," 16 October 1991. 
20 Wolfgang Palaver, "The Yugoslav Crisis: A European Perspective," in Cry Out for the World 
to Hear Us: Pax Christi on the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia, Pax Christi International, Brussels, 
1992, p. 25. . 
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weak Muslim resistance, he claims that the Catholic Church supported the establishment of 
a Croat army. 21 
In the case of Muslims, the controversial elements focus on the attitudes of prominent 
government officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both Serbs and Croats have charged that 
the ultimate aim of Muslims is to build an Islamic theocracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Serbian Orthodox bishops have charged that the democratic, inclusive, inter-ethnic state 
spoken of by President Izetbegovic and his government is simply a cover for their real goal 
of an Islamic state governed by Shariat law. 22 Bosnian Franciscan Ivo Markovic concurs with 
this fear, explaining that when Bosnian Muslims speak of democracy, they mean a unitary 
state with Muslim domination. According to him, this would be achieved initially through 
an electoral process, after which Islamic law would be imposed upon the rest of the popula-
tion. 23 
Both Croats and Serbs point to a series of events which they believe are the initial stages 
of such an effort. First, and most important, is the publication in 1990 of the Islamic Decla-
ration, written in 1970 by Izetbegovic. In this work, the President of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina clearly states that when Muslims constitute the majority of the population, then 
Islamic order will become the supreme act of democracy. However, his conception of the 
social order, modeled on Pakistan, does not sound like western democracy. He writes: 
There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic 
social and political institutions .... Islam obviously excludes the right or possibility of 
action on the part of any foreign ideology on that terrain. 24 
Following the publication of the Islamic Declaration, Serbs and Croats, alike, have charged 
the Muslims with a growing intolerance and religious exclusiveness. One indication of this 
trend was the attempt on the part of the Party of Democratic Action (Izetbegovic's political 
party) to increase the number of Muslim voters within the population to over fifty percent. 
Part of this effort was directed at attracting back Muslims who had registered as "Serbs," 
"Croats," "undecided," or "Yugoslavs" during the previous census. 25 But a second part of the 
21 Ivo Markovic, "Uloga i Polozaj Katolicke Crkve u Ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini," (trans. as "Role 
and Place of the Catholic Church in the War in Bosnia and Hercegovina," by Fedja Zimic), Zagreb, 
26 January 1993 (original on file at KrS'canska Informativna Sluzba, Zagreb). 
22
"Appeal of the Serbian Orthodox Church to the London Peace Conference on Yugoslavia," 
(Footnote 18), pp. 5-6. 
23Ivo Markovic, "Bosanski Muslimani," (trans. as "Bosnian Muslims," by Fedja Zimic), Zagreb, 
7 February 1993 (original on file at Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, Zagreb), p. 2. 
24Alija Izetbegovic, "The Islamic Declaration," Balcanica: Storia, Cultura, Politica, Volume 9, No. 
3/4, 1992, pp. 89, 103, 108, and 115-17. 
25Markovic, footnote 23, p. 2. 
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effort was the passing, by the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of a declaration entitled 
"The Program of the Resettlement of the Bosnians from Turkey," an act which it was feared 
would bring an additional four million Muslims into Bosnia. A second indication of Islamic 
domination, in the eyes of non-Muslims was the publication, in the spring of 1992, of a leaf-
let titled "The Declaration of Independence of the Islamic Republic of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina." This new republic was to include non-muslims, but was to have a constitution 
based on the Shariah and was to have one of its two houses of parliament composed of "beys," 
or leaders from the Islamic community. Despite the secularity of most Bosnian Muslims, the 
existence of documents such as these made many Serbs and Croats determined to carve out 
territories for themselves. 26 
II. Linkage between religious and ethnic identity 
It is important to examine the ways in which religious expression has permeated the 
respective cultures and shaped their national identities. One small indication of the 
importance of religion as a badge of identification, throughout the region, can be observed 
in the tendency of Gypsies to change their religious affiliation depending on the exact 
location in which they are currently living_27 Other indications vary, depending of the 
nature of the relationship of each of the three dominant religious groups to its own ethnic 
context. There are also indications, within euch context, that the pattern of expression of 
this linkage has changed over time. Religious authorities may be equally nationalistic in their 
orientation but less supportive of their current governments than they were at the beginning 
of the conflict. 
The linkage between religious and ethnic identity in this region is hardly new. Pedro 
Ramet, in his 1989 writing on "Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslavia," stated that the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, the Croatian Catholic Church, and the Bosnian Muslim community 
were "a defining factor in ethnic differentiation, perhaps even the single most important 
factor." Religion became a badge of identity and guardian of traditions for Croats, Serbs, 
and Muslims, as well as for other peoples in the region. This was particularly important for 
the preservation of identity and culture as various foreign empires dominated the region. 28 
26Dragoljub R. Zivojinovic, "Islam in the Balkans: Origins and Contemporary Implications," 
Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume 3, No. 4, 1992, pp. 62-64. 
27Interview with Franjo J urak, Catholic priest, Zagreb, 25 February 1993. 
28 Pedro Ramet, "Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslavia," in Religion and Nationalism in Soviet 
and East European Politics, ed. by Pedro Ramet, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989, pp. 299-311. 
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In fact, the simultaneous oppression of both religion and nation tended to solidify the 
connection between them in the minds of the people. 29 
Although, today, religion functions in a different way than at previous points in history, 
one can erase neither the historical influence nor the current expression of religion, upon the 
whole of society, including the present conflicts. We have already seen ways in which each 
tradition has acted to legitimize the aspirations of its people, and often its government, espe-
cially when it perceives that its liberty and/or rights are under threat. We shall now turn to 
ways in which the dominant religions have helped to foster a nationalistic ideology and so-
cial/political infrastructure. The specific role of religion in the conflicts will also be 
illustrated by the use of religious symbols and the targeting of religious persons and objects, 
by secular groups. 
A. Serbian Orthodox 
The Serbian Orthodox Church has been a self -conscious contributor to the development 
of a nationalistic ideology. 30 Like the whole of the Orthodox tradition, the ecclesiastical 
framework of the church is very much centered on the concept of nation. Theological 
constructs, such as symphonia or svetosavlje, have specifically linked church and nation as 
well as religious and ethnic identity.31 In fact, ethnic belonging easily overshadows the 
religious. The use of the phrase, "Srpska Crkva" (Serbian Church) suggests that there is no 
other legitimate Serbian church outside of Orthodoxy, an impression strengthened by the 
adoption of the saying, "One who is not Orthodox is not Serb," by the patriarchate in the 
1920s.32 Serbian people who belong to other religions frequently complain of being treated 
as though they were traitors. 33 
The linkage between religion and nation does not mean, however, that the Serbian 
Orthodox Church has given automatic approval to the present government. Although the 
initial response of the church was to see the Milosevic government as the liberator of the 
29Tonci Kuzmanic, "Former Yugoslavia: The Religious War?" (unpublished revised version of an 
article published in Religioni e Societa, No.4, 1992, Firenze), p. 12. 
30 Although in general terms this is true and will be documented in the next few paragraphs, some 
of the leadership are less nationalistic than others. While most have sympathy for the nationalist 
movement, and a few a close to radical movements, some have a more balanced view. 
31Interview with Bojan Popov, Serbian Orthodox deacon, Novi Sad, Serbia, 25 June 1991; and 
Ivo Markovic, "Srpsko Pravoslavlje i Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva" (trans. as "Serbian Orthodoxy and 
Serbian Orthodox Church," by Fedja Zimic), Zagreb, [n.d.], pp. 3-4. 
32 lnterview with Alexander Birvis, Baptist Pastor, Beograd, II March 1993. 
33Interview with Aleksandar Mitrovic, Pentecostal pastor, Novi Sad, Serbia, 14 March 1993. 
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Serbian people, this relationship did not last. In fact, the bishops of the church have faulted 
the present government for not allowing "the Church to assume her rightful place in society 
which belonged to her for centuries .. .''34 One of the areas of contention is the fact that the 
government has not reinstated Orthodox catechism in the public schools. There is no 
indication of concern for the rights of non-Orthodox children in Serbia despite the fact that 
the Serbian Orthodox Church objects to Catholic catechism in Croatian schools.35 
The aim of the "theology of the nation" was to provide a sense of belonging for the 
Serbian people, especially for those who lived in other parts of Yugoslavia. Leading Serbian 
Orthodox theologians focused on the sufferings of the Serbian people, especially at the hands 
of Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians in Kosovo. Serbian Orthodox newspapers have published 
such accounts of Serbian victimization since the late 1970s, stressing their claims of the 
uniqueness of Serbian genocide. In 1991, this perspective was authorized by the Holy Synod 
of the Serbian Orthodox Church when they referred to the suffering of the Serbian nation, 
during World War II at the Croatian concentration camp of Jasenovac, as the sin of all sins 
and equated it with the suffering of Christ.36 The cataloguing of victimization in Croatia 
and Kosovo, fed by theological interpretation, is paralleled by a glaring inability to view the 
actions of its own people with the same attitude of repentance which is required of others.37 
Instead of reciprocal repentance by the Serbian Orthodox Church, there has been ecclesiasti-
cal sanction for quite astounding conspiracy theories regarding presently perceived dangers. 
For example, the Reis-ul-ulema Jakub Selimoski recounts a statement by Patriarch Pavle in 
1992 alleging the existence of a Vatican-Tehran-fundamentalist plot against the Serbian 
people.38 
At the same time that these developments occurred within the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
an extreme form of Serbian nationalism was emerging outside of either church or 
34
"Memorandum of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 14-27 May 
1992," footnote 6, p. 4. 
35 Paul Mojzes, "The Role of the Religious Communities in the War in Former Yugoslavia" 
(unpublished revised version of article written for a conference, "Religion and Crisis in Eastern 
Europe After Communism," in Houston, Texas, 23-25 April 1993), pp. 23-24. 
36Serbian Orthodox theologians, writing from this perspective include Atanasije Jevtic, Nikolaj 
Velimirovic, and Justin Popovic (See Geert van Dartel, "The Nations and the Churches in 
Yugoslavia," Religion. State and Societv, Volume 20, Nos. 3 & 4, 1992, pp. 281-82; and Markovic, 
Footnote 31, p. 3. 
37 As an example of the latter, the Serbian Orthodox Church had lamented that no Roman 
Catholic official attended the dedication of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Jasenovac, commemorat-
ing the victims of Croatian fascism (Mojzes, Footnote 35, p. 22). 
38Selimoski, footnote 13. 
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government. Secular writers such as Dra~kovic, Cosic, Seselj, and Miroljub Jevtic began 
looking for the roots of nationalism within the medieval Orthodox Church and state, 
especially during periods when Serbs were perceived to be the victims at the hands of Croats, 
Bosnians, and Albanians. As the writers attempted to explain contemporary events in the 
light of this nationalistic view of history, there resulted a blatant declaration of Holy War 
against Muslims and Croats.39 
When this war finally erupted, the presence of religious symbols, religious targets, and 
even religious leaders in the war effort served as indication that a form of religious identi-
fication had accompanied nationalism into the souls of even those who were avowedly non-
religious. Religious symbols appeared in many forms--on military weapons and vehicles, in 
the use of the three finger chetnik sign (symbolizing the Trinity), and in signs of the cross 
which were carved or burned into the bodies of Muslim people.40 Religious objects and 
people were targeted, not only by the Yugoslav Peoples Army, the various semi-private 
Serbian Armies, and the various Serbian militias, but also by ordinary citizens. In Bosnia 
and Croatia, mosques and Catholic Churches were destroyed, and Muslim and Catholic 
religious leaders were imprisoned and killed. But even within Serbia, itself, Catholics and 
Muslims have complained of rock throwing, bombs, evictions, death threats, and other forms 
of harassment at the hands of ordinary citizens, not the government.41 Finally, there have 
been cases of priests blessing weapons and soldiers on the front lines of battle.42 
B. Croatian Catholic 
Catholic ecclesiology does not advocate the formation of national churches. Therefore, 
the influence of religion in the development of nationalism took a different form in Croatia. 
Instead of building upon a history of theological linkage between church and nation, there 
was a long-term sense of Croatian identification with the worldwide Catholic Church and a 
specific identification, on the part of the worldwide Catholic Church, with the justice of this 
390ne of the books, written by Atanasije Jevtic, was even titled Jihad (Kuzmanic, footnote 29, 
p. 12.). 
40Interview with anonymous Muslim refugee, Gashinci refugee camp, near Djakovo, Croatia, 11 
March 1993; the Rijaset (leadership of the Islamic community), in a statement reported in "Muslim 
Leadership Proclaims," Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, KIS AG.23.01 [July 1992]; and Kuzmanic, 
footnote 29, p. 4. 
41 Interview with Jusufspahic; K uharic', footnote 17; Kuzmanic, p. 4; Rijaset, footnote 40; and 
interview with Bishop Franc Perko, in the Croatian newspaper, Globus (as reported in "We Are More 
and More Times Unable to Carry Out Our Worship Service," Krscanska lnformativna Sluzba, KIS 
AH1402, [August 1992], pp. 1-2). 
42 Kuzmanic, footnote 29, p. 4. 
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particular Croatian cause. At the same time, this relationship has occasionally been expressed 
in overtly theological terms. In like manner to Serbian Orthodox theology, the war is 
depicted as the Golgotha of the Croatian nation,43 and the Croatian people are depicted as 
"chosen" by God while in the midst of great suffering. Josip Beljan, writing in the Catho-
lic publication, Veritas, amplifies this perspective. 
God has by way of his Church, by way of the Holy Father, looked at his faithful people, 
spoke out on their behalf, directly intervened in history, in the struggle, warring together 
with his people for their liberation .... With this war God also returned to his people, 
in its heart and home. [God] Returned to the entire mass media, political, social, and 
state life of Croatia, from where he was driven out 45 years earlier. The cross of Christ 
stands next to the Croatian flag .... The Church is glad for the return of its people "from 
the twofold" slavery--Serbian and communist. This is a great "kairos" of God's grace for 
the entire Croatian people .... Here was not a battle for a piece of Croatian or Serbian 
land but a war between good and evil, Christianity and communism, culture and 
barbarity, civilization and primitivism, democracy and dictatorship, love and hatred ... 
. Thank God, it all ended well, due to the Pope and Croatian politics.44 
The involvement of the Vatican, in gathering international support for the recognition 
of Croatia and Slovenia, was one of the causes underlying the Serbian claim that the Catholic 
Church was part of an anti-Serbian, anti-Orthodox, conspiracy. In one way, the identifica-
tion of the Croats with an international church made it even more frightening to the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. The Serbs saw a new international alignment developing along religious 
lines, the parameters of which reminded them of historical humiliations. Furthermore, this 
new alliance was then acting to interfere in the internal affairs of their country and to cal-
lously rebuff the legitimate concerns for self -determination on the part of Serbs living in 
Croatia. But the Vatican chose to adopt the Croat view that it was a matter of the human 
rights and legitimate self-determination of the Croat people, though it did press the Croatian 
government for protection of minority rights within its own borders.45 
In addition to the Vatican, the leadership of the Croatian Catholic Church played an 
important role in the quest for Croatian sovereignty. Even in the late 1980s, Cardinal 
Kuharic and other Catholic bishops were advocates of Croatian national interests. For 
example, despite a considerable threat level to Croatian Serbs, they pressed for the exclusive 
use of Croatian language and alphabet within their society and for the creation of a Croatian 
Orthodox Church, independent from Serbian Orthodoxy. After the Croatian Democratic 
43
van Dartel, "The Nations and the Churches in Yugoslavia," footnote 36, p. 281. 
44 Josip Be !jan, "Priznata V jernost," Veritas, Nos. 9-10, September-October 1992, Zagreb, pp. 
24-25 (trans. by Paul Mojzes, in "The Role of the Religious Communities in the War in Former 
Yugoslavia," footnote, p. 17.). 
45Gerard F. Powers, "Testing the Moral Limits of Self -determination: Northern Ireland and 
Croatia," The Fletcher Forum, Summer 1992, pp. 36-37. 
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Union (Hrvatska Democratska Zajednica or HDZ) came to power, the Catholic Church, along 
with the nationalistic movement, could emerge from the role of opposition. Then the 
Catholic leadership displayed almost unconditional support of the new government and its 
nationalistic policies. They were present at the opening of parliament and appeared with 
state officials in the media. After succeeding in their attempt to influence the political 
process in Croatia, the Catholic leadership turned its attention to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
where they supported the activity of the HDZ in violation of laws which forbade the 
existence of political parties formed exclusively on the basis of national or religious identity. 
The attempt, on the part of the Catholic Church, to change this law was a major factor in 
the division of Bosnian politics along religio-ethnic lines. As a result, the Catholic Church 
must bear its share of responsibility for the ensuing ethnic confrontation which has led to 
such tragedy. 46 This must be said despite recent attempts on the part of the Catholic Church, 
in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to distance itself from the political authorities. 
Until the first part of 1993, the actions of Vatican, cardinal, and bishops clearly served 
to solidify even more the Croat and Catholic identities. It is no wonder that even a former 
communist politician, such as Tudjman, began to refer to "all that is Croatian and Catholic," 
as though the two were inseparable.47 Crkva u Hrvata, "the church among Croats," was as 
definitive a statement of linkage as was Srpska crkva. 
As with Serbia, this linkage between religion and nationality can be seen in the war effort 
through the presence of religious symbols, religious targets, and religious leaders. The 
symbols include soldiers being ornamented with rosaries and crosses as well as weapons and 
vehicles being decorated. 48 Targets include places of worship and sacred objects, as well as 
threats to other clergy. The Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Zagreb-Ljubljana 
received menacing letters from the Veterans Society of Croatia saying that the first to be 
attacked will be all Serbian bishops.49 Finally, Catholic priests, many of whom are refugees 
from occupied territories of Croatia, have been sent as army chaplains who bless soldiers and 
weapons on the front lines. A few priests, including a Croatian Franciscan who later 
46Mojzes, "The Role of the Religious Communities in the War in Former Yugoslavia," footnote 
35, pp. 17-19. 
47Franjo Tudjman, letter to Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle (reported in "Letter of Croatian 
President to Head of Serbian Orthodox Church," Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, Zagreb, 20 March 
1992). 
48Kuzmanic, footnote 29, p. 4. 
49
"Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop Accuses Croatian Authorities ... ," footnote 14. 
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accepted a political office and numerous former Catholic seminarians m Sarajevo, have 
carried guns and accompanied troops into battle.50 
C. Bosnian Muslims 
The Muslim faith, like the Catholic and unlike the Orthodox, has more of an internation-
al scope and is, therefore, less nationalistic in orientation. Islam is a worldwide faith with 
a highly developed supra-national consciousness. At the same time, the Bosnian Muslims are 
the only Muslims in the world who are considered Muslim by nationality. In the early 1970s, 
Tito gave them the status of a nationality within Yugoslavia in order to balance the power 
of both Serbs and Croats. Within the former Yugoslav context, the only distinguishing 
characteristic, upon which to base their independent national identity, was their religion and 
the culture which had formed around it. This was true despite the high degree of 
secularization among these people. Religion, though not practiced by the majority of people, 
had become an essential mark of identity. 
At the same time, as already indicated, the political leadership, which developed in the 
Muslim community in preparation for the 1990 elections and which subsequently has become 
the ruling party in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been very much influenced by the Islamic 
faith. Furthermore, to understand the Muslim perspective, as embraced by these religious 
Muslims, it is important to understand the relationship between religion and politics in much 
of Islam. When living in countries where they are a minority, Muslims express their faith 
primarily within the privacy of their religious community. However, when they become the 
dominant group, there is often a sense of obligation to implement the supposed optimum 
form of governance, i.e. to organize the state according to Islamic law. It is assumed that this 
state of affairs will be best for everyone. A Muslim intellectual from Bosnia clearly stated 
this perspective by saying that, even Christians, in their longing for justice, should be in 
favor of an Islamic state because it is the most just form of organization for human society. 
Given this attitude, it is not surprising that a Bosnian Croat would conclude that, for 
Muslims, tolerance does not imply equal partnership, but only a temporary acceptance of the 
perspective of the other on the way to establishment of the ideal Islamic society. 51 
Another aspect of Islamic aspiration, which has produced fear among non-Muslim 
peoples, is the pan-Islamic model of supra-national unity of the worldwide Islamic 
50Mojzes, footnote 35, p. 17; and Franz K. Prueler, "Report on Caritas Europe Mission to Croatia 
and Serbia," 9 September 1991 (on file at Catholic Relief Services, Baltimore, Maryland), p. 2. 
51 Markovic, footnote 23, p. I. At the same time, as is the case in both the Serb and Croat 
contexts, one can find statements on the part of individual leaders which contradict this impression. 
For example, Darko Lukic, Minister for Religious Affairs in the Bosnian government has spoken of 
his vision for a state in which three faiths could Jive together (Lukic, footnote 9). 
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community. Izetbegovic, in his Islamic Declaration, envisioned the creation of a great Islamic 
federation "from Morocco to Indonesia, from tropical Africa to Central Asia." He pictured 
the creation of supra-national Islamic structures in the economic, cultural and political 
spheres.52 A secret trip by Izetbegovic to Libya, followed by one to Iran, both prior to the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, simply increased fears among non-Muslims regarding the 
president's pan-Islamic intentions. Bosnian Serbs responded to the meeting with Qadhafi by 
calling it "a secret alliance between the Bosnian leaders and an Islamic despot from the Near 
East." Furthermore, Izetbegovic, himself, admitted that he received support for his political 
views in Tehran. 53 These events have fueled charges by both Serbs and Croats of a growing 
Islamic fundamentalistic influence brought in from these two countries. 54 Muslim leaders 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina have repeatedly denied that Islamic fundamentalism has had 
much of a following there. They have claimed that any fundamentalism has been the result 
of Serbian aggression toward Muslim people. 55 However, even sympathetic observers have 
indicated that leading Bosnian Muslim theologians, imams, and activists, such as Isma'il 
Balic, Halid Hajimulic, Halid Varatanovic, and Fadil Porca, have increasingly identified with 
52 Izetbegovic·, footnote 24, pp. 119-20. 
53Zivojinovic, footnote 26, pp. 58-60. 
54The Catholic Archbishop of Sarajevo, Vinko Puljic, said that though Catholic-Muslim relations 
in Bosnia had been good, that "now [January 1993] unfortunately Islamic fundamentalism is growing, 
brought in from Libya and Iran" (John Thavis, "Archbishop Says Bosnian Catholics Fear Ethnic 
Cleansing by Muslims," Catholic News Service, Rome, 19 January 1993, p. 21 ). Serbian specialist 
in Islamic studies, Darko Tanaskovic, has claimed that, on the basis of the PDA's foreign policy, 
together with its domestic policy, its party program documents, and Izetbegovic's Islamic Declaration, 
it is clear that the governing party of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the kind of political organization 
which would be labeled as "Islamistic" or "fundamentalist" in any Muslim country. Public denials of 
its religious character have been ploys to gain support from the West and popularity within a highly 
secularized indigenous population. But when addressing Bosnian soldiers for the purpose of height-
ening their fighting spirits, as well as when attempting to gain support from Muslim countries, the 
religious dimension is emphasized (Darko Tanaskovic, "Is a Religious War Going on in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina?" [Report on] Round Table Conference of Independent Scholars From All Republics of 
Former Yugoslavia, at the Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, 27 Septem-
ber to 1 October 1992, pp. 23-24 ). Tanaskovic has also asserted that the influence of more radical, 
non-hanafi and non-Sunni political interpretations of Islam has been rising. He pointed to references 
to both radical Muslim ideologues from the Middle Ages (ibn Taymiyya and Ibn a!Gawzi) and 
contemporary nee-fundamentalist ideologues (Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and al-Qardawi) in recent 
Bosnian Muslim literature (Darko Tanaskovic, "Muslims and muslims in Former Yugoslavia, Part I," 
East European Reporter, Volume 5, No.3, May-June 1992, p. 13). Finally, Tanaskovic has spoken 
about the growing anti-Serbian rhetoric, between 1987 and 1992, in Muslim periodicals such as The 
Muslim Voice (Interview with Darko Tanaskovic, Beograd, 26 August 1992). 
55 Patrick Moore, "Islamic Aspects of the Yugoslav Crisis," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
Research Report, Volume I, No. 28, 10 July 1992, p. 38. 
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radical, although not fundamentalist, movements.56 Such distinctions do little to quell the 
fears of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The pan-Islamic movement is not 
limited to fundamentalists. Even Muslim traditionalists, from places like Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia, have responded to the call for Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
difference is only one of tactics, with fundamentalists using forceful means and 
traditionalists using quieter means. One cannot ignore, therefore, allegations that, for 
Muslims of all kinds, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is increasingly taking on the 
character of a Jihad, even where that was not initially the case. 57 Another growing 
indication of this movement toward Jihad is the increasing occurrence among Muslims, as 
with the Serbian Orthodox and the Croatian Catholics, of religious leaders who support the 
war effort58 and of militias which target religious objects and persons of other faiths. 59 
III. Implications for future efforts by religious groups 
In these conflicts religion is clearly being used as a mark of identity, by which all the 
warring sides distinguish themselves from each other and with which they seek to legitimize 
their actions. The three major faith traditions have all contributed to this reality. The 
smaller religious traditions have not been evaluated here since their impact on ethnic identity 
formation is either minimal or non-existent. Because some of these groups lack any linkage 
with ethnic identity, and in fact actually bridge the ethnic divides, they can potentially play 
a constructive role well beyond that suggested by their small numbers. 
Yet, the potential for constructive involvement in reconciliation efforts does not rest 
exclusively, nor even primarily, with the small religious communities. There is also consid-
erable evidence of a desire for peace among many people within the three predominant faith 
communities. This can be seen, not only at the hierarchical level of inter-faith statements, 
but also at the level of local clergy. We should certainly encourage continued efforts at 
56Khalid Duran, "Bosnia, The Other Andalusia: After the Evil Empire, an Evil New World 
Order," unpublished paper, Gaithersburg, Maryland, [n.d.], pp. 21-24. 
57Tanaskovic, "Is a Religious War Going On in Bosnia and Hercegovina?," footnote 54, pp. 24-
25. The concept of Jihad is beginning to take root among some of the Muslim refugee population, 
even among the many who, before the war, were proponents of peace. One sad account of this shift 
from a largely peaceful orientation is the story of a Muslim refugee who once taught pupils to love, 
but now speaks only of Jihad (Branimir Talajic', in an article in the Zagreb newspaper, Novi Vjesnik 
[trans. by Branimir and Yelka Talajic for Pacific News Service, printed in the National Catholic 
Reporter, 4 September 1992, p. 73]). 
58Interview with Mustafa Cercic, imam of mosque in Zagreb, 20 August 1992. 
59The Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland, "Communique of British and Irish Church-
es Delegation to Serbia and Croatia 26.1.93 - 2.2.93" (on file at Conference of European Churches, 
Geneva). 
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reconciliation by many of these religious leaders who truly desire to be peacemakers. 
However, such efforts will be most successful if the peacemakers are fully aware of the 
negative contributions of their own religious traditions and take appropriate measures to 
counter these negative effects. 
Sorting out all the positive and negative forms of identity formation, and thereby 
identifying every contribution of each tradition to the origins of the conflict, is a task which 
goes well beyond the scope of this paper. It is one which needs to be addressed in full by 
persons within each religious community. While it is still important to affirm the positive 
roles played in forming the identity of one's people, there must be a self -criticism which at 
present is rare.60 Most people respond defensively to allegations against their own group, 
citing their own list of allegations against their adversary. This confession needs to be 
spoken in conversations with individuals, as well as written in formal statements by the 
various religious hierarchies. The confession should include admission of specific acts as well 
as indication of a general awareness of the negative contribution of one's own faith in the 
identity formation process. 
ln addition to confession, there will need to be repentance. Admission of guilt must be 
accompanied by concrete actions to counter the negative effects which have come from a 
singular preoccupation with protecting one's own people. For example, each religious 
community could take the lead within its society for establishing and protecting minority 
rights of other peoples. This should go beyond the extension of relief efforts to refugees 
from other ethnic groups, a very important ministry already performed by the humanitarian 
aid organizations within each faith community. Such efforts, however, could become the 
springboard for attempts to redress the broader legal and social problems facing minority 
groups in each society. 
The Bosnian Minister for Religious Affairs claims that local clergy are able to play a 
critical role in amending the problems facing these societies because of the influence they 
have with their own people. 61 ln addition, the various religious traditions have the moral re-
sources with which to begin such a healing process. But they will need to reaffirm a primary 
allegiance to God, above that given to their own people. The recognition of a higher alle-
giance can be critical in one's ability to take the necessary risks and restore trust within 
--broken relationships. As the Catholic Bishop of Sibenik rightfully suggests, the power of 
600ne exception to this is a request for forgiveness, on the part of a delegation of Serbian women, 
made to their Croatian and Slovenian colleagues, at a conference of the International Interdenomi-
national Women's Movement ("Serbian Christian Women Asked for Forgiveness of Croatian and 
Slovenian Colleagues," reported in Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, KIS AK.I2.02, 12 November 
1992). 
61 Lukic, footnote 9. 
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prayer, an expression of relationship with God, can help people both to respect themselves 
and to respect the differences between people.62 
62 Interview with Bishop Srecko Badurina, "We Believe in a New Beginning Based on Prayer and 
Works" (reported in Krscanska Informativna Sluzba, Zagreb, 24 February 1993), p. 2. 
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